Books and Major Publications

Emilsson, Anton. (2024). Minimal Optimism: Reading P. F. Strawson on Responsibility. [Doctoral dissertation] Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University.

Johansson Werkmäster, Marta. (2023). Aspects of Blame. [Doctoral dissertation] Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University.

Velichkov, Alexander. (2023). Responsibility and Ambivalence, [Doctoral dissertation] Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University.

Szigeti, András, & Talbert, Matthew. (Eds.). (2022). Morality and Agency – Themes from Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press.

Russell, Paul. (2021). Recasting Hume & Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.

Talbert, Matthew, & Wolfendale, Jessica. (2019). War Crimes: Causes, Excuses, and Blame. Oxford University Press.

Hartman, Robert J. (2017). In Defense of Moral Luck: Why Luck Often Affects Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness. Routledge.

Russell, Paul. (2017). The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press.

Talbert, Matthew. (2016). Moral Responsibility: An Introduction. Key concepts in philosophy. Polity Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (forthcoming). Responsibility: Taken, Assumed, Recognized. In A Social Practice Account of Responsible Persons, by Cheshire Calhoun, with Gunnar Björnsson, Jules Holroyd, Heidi Maibom. M. Egler and A. Archer (Eds.).

Blomberg, Olle. (forthcoming). Authority-based accountability is causally extended accountability. Journal of Social Ontology.

Blomberg, Olle. (forthcoming). Review of D. Justin Coates’s, In Praise of Ambivalence (OUP, 2023). Philosophical Quarterly.

Leventi, Marianna and Stedler, Samantha. (forthcoming). Who is responsible? Social Identity, Robot Errors and Blame Attribution. IOS Press, Series Frontiers of AI and its Application.

Mickelson, Kristin. (forthcoming). (In)compatibilism. In J. Campbell (Ed.), A Companion to Free Will. Wiley-Blackwell.

Pál-Wallin, Robert. (forthcoming). Fear as a reactive attitude. In Ami Harbin (Ed.), The Philosophy of Fear: Historical and Interdisciplinary Approach. Bloomsbury.

Petersson, Björn. (forthcoming). We-intentions and immunity to error in misidentification. Analysis.

Rabinowicz, Wlodek. (forthcoming) Two Intuitions about Free Will – Some Afterthoughts. Theoria.

Russell, Paul. (forthcoming). The Reason View and the Morality System. In M. Frauchiger & M. Stepanians (Eds.). Themes from Wolf. De Gruyter.

Russell, Paul. (forthcoming). Recasting Responsibility: Hume and Williams. In Marcel Van Ackeren and Matthieu Florian Queloz (Eds.) Making Sense of the Past: Bernard Williams and the History of Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Telech, Daniel. (forthcoming). Fortunately Forgiven. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.

Telech, Daniel. (forthcoming). Standing to Praise. European Journal of Philosophy.

Telech, Daniel. (forthcoming). Communicating Praise. In M. Kiener (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.

Telech, Daniel. (forthcoming). Aesthetic Benevolence. Ratio.

Todd, Patrick. (forthcoming). Let's See You Do Better. Ergo.

Todd, Patrick. (forthcoming). The Consequences of Incompatibilism. In M. Kiener (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge

Todd, Patrick, & Brian Rabern. (forthcoming). Resisting the Epistemic Argument for Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies.

Todd, Patrick. (forthcoming). It Would Be Bad if Compatibilism Were True; Therefore, It Isn't. Philosophical Issues, M.l McKenna and C. Sartorio (Eds.). Special issue on the topic of free will.

Velichkov, Alexander. (forthcoming). Fitting Guilt Without Blameworthiness. In The Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Volume 9). Oxford University Press.

Johansson Werkmäster, M. (forthcoming). Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen: The Beam and The Mote: On Blame, Standing, and Normativity New York: Oxford University Press, 2024, Hardback. (ISBN978-0-19-754459-4) 272 pp. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

Johansson Werkmäster, M. & Werkmäster, J. (forthcoming). Rejecting norms of standing for private blame. Ratio.

Johansson Werkmäster, M. & Werkmäster, J. (forthcoming). Blame and Proportionality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

Blomberg, Olle [with Erik Malmqvist]. (2024). Cooperative Activity, Shared Intention, and Exploitation. Ethics 134(3): 387-401.

Leventi, Marianna. (2024). Victim Blame, Justified Risks, and Imperfect Victims. Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 10 (1/2).

Leventi, Marianna. (2024). The victim’s perspective: How thinking about the victim can provide answers to philosophical issues of responsibility. dePICTions volume 4: Victimhood. The Paris Institute for Critical Thinking.

Russell, Paul. (2024). Responsibility After 'Morality': Strawson's Naturalism and Williams' Genealogy. In A. Bengtson, B. De Mesel & S. Heyndels (Eds). P. F. Strawson and His Legacy. Oxford University Press. pp. 234-259.

Blomberg, Olle. (2023). Tuomela on social norms and group-social normativity. In M. Garcia-Godinez & R. Mellin (Eds). Tuomela on Sociality (pp. 219-241). Palgrave Macmillan.

Blomberg, Olle (2023). How to be morally responsible for another’s free intentional action. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 25(3), 545-579

Blomberg, Olle, & Petersson, Björn. (2023). Team Reasoning and Collective Moral Obligation. Social Theory and Practice. (online first)

Gunnemyr, Mattias, & Torpe Touborg, Caroline. (2023). Reasons for action: making a difference to the security of outcomes. Philosophical Studies, 180, 333-362.

Gunnemyr, Mattias, & Torpe Touborg, Caroline. (2023). You just didn't care enough: quality of will, causation, and blameworthiness for actions, omissions, and outcomes. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 24(1), 1-33.

Petersson, Björn. (2023). Group morality and moral groups: ethical aspects of the Tuomelan we-mode. In M. Garcia-Godinez & R. Mellin (Eds). Tuomela on Sociality (pp. 201-218). Palgrave Macmillan.

Szigeti, András. (2023). Do We Have Obligations to Collectives? In A. Garcia, M. Gunnemyr and J. Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality and Social Reality. Essays Dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen (pp. 405-416). Lund University Press.

Szigeti, András. (2023). Editorial for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice issue 26/2. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26(2), 1-2.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2022). Blame, Deserved Guilt, and Harms to Standing. In A.B. Carlsson (Ed.), Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility (pp. 198-216). Cambridge University Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2022). Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility, In D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (pp. 494-515). Oxford University Press.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2022). Accountability, Answerability and Attributability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility. In D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (pp. 73-88). Oxford University Press.

Johansson Werkmäster, Marta. (2022). Blame as a sentiment. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30(3), 239-253.

Radovic, Susanna [with Linda Gröning, Unn. K. Haukvik, & Stephen Morse]. (2022). Remodelling criminal insanity: Exploring philosophical, legal, and medical premises of the medical model used in Norwegian law. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 81, 1-7.

Russell, Paul. (2022). Free Will and the Tragic Predicament: Making Sense of Williams. In A. Szigeti & M. Talbert (Eds.), Morality and Agency – Themes from Bernard Williams (pp. 161-181). Oxford University Press.

Russell, Paul. (2022). Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes. In D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (pp. 519-541). Oxford University Press.

Szigeti, András. (2022). The heuristics theory of emotions and moderate rationalism. Philosophical Psychology, 1-24.

Szigeti, András [with György Barabás]. (2022). Using Quotas as a Remedy for Structural Injustice. Erkenntnis, 1-19.

Talbert, Matthew. (2022). Attributionist Theories of Moral Responsibility. In D. K. Nelkin and D. Pereboom (eds.) In D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (pp. 53-70). Oxford University Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2021). Being Implicated: On the Fittingness of Guilt and Indignation over Outcome. Philosophical Studies,178(11), 3543–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01613-4

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2021). On Individual and Shared Obligations: In Defense of the Activist’s Perspective. In Mark Budolfson, Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (Eds.). Philosophy and Climate Change (pp. 252-280).Oxford University Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar, & Bykvist, Krister. (2021). 'Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility', by Elinor Mason. Mind, 103(519), 978–986. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa010

Blomberg, Olle. (2021). 'Getting Our Act Together: A Theory of Collective Moral Obligations', by Anne Schwenkenbecher. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 24(3), 875-877.

Blomberg, Olle. (2021). 'Not In Their Name: Are Citizens Culpable For Their States' Actions?', by Holly Lawford-Smith. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 18(5), 554-557.

Emilsson, Anton. (2021). Kortfattat om fri vilja [English translation: ”In brief on Free Will"]. Svensk filosofi. URL: svenskfilosofi.se

Russell, Paul. (2021). The Limits of Free Will: Replies to Bennett, Smith and Wallace. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 24, 357–373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10147-3

Russell, Paul. (2021). 'The Misuse of Morality'; Review of Grandstanding, by J. Tosi & B. Warmke. Times Literary Supplement. https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/the-misuse-of-morality/

Russell, Paul. (2021). Responsibility Skepticism and Strawson’s Naturalism: Review Essay on Pamela Hieronmyi, 'Freedom, Resentment and the Metaphysics of Morals'. Ethics,131(4), 754-776.

Szigeti, András. (2021). (En)aktivismens begränsningar – Om Patrizio Lo Prestis 'Att förstå social förståelse’. Filosofisk tidskrift, 2.

Szigeti, András. (2021). Emotions as indeterminate justifiers. Synthese, 199, 11995–12017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03321-2

Talbert, Matthew. (2021). Psychopaths and Symmetry: A Reply to Nelkin. Philosophia, 49, 1233-1245.

Munthe, Christian [with Dorna Behdadi]. (2020). A Normative Approach to Artificial Moral Agency. Minds and Machines, 30(2), 195–218.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2020). Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligations without Collective Agents. In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility (pp. 127-141). Routledge.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2020). Group Duties without Decision-Making Procedures. Journal of Social Ontology, 6(1), 127–139.

Björnsson, Gunnar & Shepherd, Joshua. (2020). Determinism and Attributions of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology,33(4), 549-68.

Blomberg, Olle. (2020). What we ought to do: The decisions and duties of non-agential groups. Journal of Social Ontology, 6(1), 101-116.

Blomberg, Olle & Hindriks, Frank. (2020). Collective Responsibility and Acting Together. In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility (pp. 142-154). Routledge.

Hartman, Robert J. (2020). Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(1), 105-118.

Hartman, Robert J. (2020). Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck. Erkenntnis, 85, 1417-36.

Jeppsson, Sophia.M.I. (2020). Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited. Neuroethics, 14, 177-190.. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-020-09436-6

Mickelson, Kristin. (2020). The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What? In Philosophia, 49, 705-722. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00243-0

Petersson, Björn. (2020). Collective Guilt Feelings. In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility (pp. 228-242). Routledge.

Radovic, Susanna [with Lena Eriksson & Moa Kindström Dahlin]. (2020). Absence of insight as a catch-all extra-legislative factor in Swedish mental health law proceedings. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 27(4), 601-619. https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2020.1739577

Radovic, Susanna [with Linda Gröning, Unn K. Haukvik, & Gerben Meynen]. (2020). Constructing criminal insanity: The roles of legislators, judges and experts in Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. New Journal of European Criminal Law 11(3), 390-410. https://doi.org/10.1177/2032284420950485

Russell, Paul. (2020). Hume on Free Will.InEdward N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2007 Edition; substantial revision May 2020). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-freewill/

Szigeti, András. (2020). The Discursive Dilemma and Collective Responsibility. In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility (pp. 297-312). Routledge.

Hartman, Robert J. (2019). Moral Luck and the Unfairness of Morality. Philosophical Studies, 176, 3179-97.

Hartman, Robert J. (2019). Accepting Moral Luck. In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck (pp. 227-238). Routledge.

Hartman, Robert J. (2019). Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 43. 136-150.

Hartman, Robert J. (2019). Review of Agnes Callard's 'Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming'. The Philosophical Quarterly, 69, 427-429.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2019). Towards a Structural Ownership Condition on Moral Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49(4), 458-480.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2019). Manipulators and Moral Standing. Philosophia, 47(4), 1197-1214.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2019).Reasons to Forgive. Analysis, 79(2), 242-251.

Mickelson, Kristin. (2019). The Problem of Free Will and Determinism: An Abductive Approach.Social Philosophy & Policy, 36(1), 154-172.

Mickelson, Kristin. (2019). Free Will, Self-Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 43, 224-256.

Munthe, Christian. (2019). Precautionary principle (version 2). In H. Lafolette (Ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee550.pub2

Petersson, Björn. (2019). Too Many Omissions, Too Much Causation? In Tobias Hansson Wahlberg and Robin Stenwall (Eds.), Maurinian Truths: Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday. Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund.

Russell, Paul. (2019). Hume's Optimism and Williams' Pessimism. In S. G. Chappell & M. van Ackeren (Eds.), Ethics beyond the Limits: New Essays on Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (pp. 37-52). Routledge.

Szigeti, Andras [with Erik Malmqvist]. (2019). Exploitation and Joint Action. Journal of Social Philosophy, 50(3), 280-300.

Szigeti, András [with Erik Malmqvist]. (2019). Exploitation and Remedial Duties. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 38(1), 55-72. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12407

Szigeti, András [with John A. Michael]. (2019). The Group Knobe Effect: Evidence that People Intuitively Attribute Agency and Responsibility to Groups. Philosophical Explorations, 22(1), 44-61.

Szigeti, András [with László Bernáth & Timothy O’ Connor]. (2019). Transcendental Arguments and the Possibility of Free Will. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 15(2), 5-12.

Talbert, Matthew. (2019). Moral Responsibility. In Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/

Talbert, Matthew. (2019). The Attributionist Approach to Moral Luck. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 43, 24-41.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2018). Gemensamma skyldigheter. Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 2, 69-79. 

Blomberg, Olle. & Petersson, Björn. (2018). Plikt att kollektivisera? Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 2, 36-46.

Hartman, Robert J. (2018). Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4, 165-183.

Hartman, Robert J. (2018). Review of Rik Peels's 'Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology'. Ethics, 128, 646-651.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2018). Irrational Option Exclusion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(3), 537-551.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2018). Review of Derk Pereboom's 'Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life'. Utilitas, 30, 241-244.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2018). The Threat from Manipulation Arguments. American Philosophical Quarterly, 55(1), 37-50.

Matheson, Benjamin [with Andrew Khoury]. (2018). Is Blameworthiness Forever? Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 4(2), 204-224.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2018). Against Elective Forgiveness. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21(3), 569-584.

Petersson, Björn. (2018). Over-determined Harms and Harmless Pluralities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 21(4), 841-850.

Russell, Paul. (2018). Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich's Third Way. In G. Carusco (Ed.), Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity (pp. 159-179). Palgrave Macmillan.

Russell, Paul. (2018). Bernard Williams: Ethics from a Human Point of View. In Times Literary Supplement:"Footnotes to Plato". [December 18, 2018]. https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/bernard-williams-ethics-human-point-view/

Szigeti, András. (2018). Kan ett kollektiv inte göra sitt bästa trots att dess medlemmar gör det? Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, 2, 1-12.

Talbert, Matthew. (2018). Judgmental Alternatives, Empathy, and Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 175(4). 973-80. 

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2017). Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability. In D. Shoemaker (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (pp. 141-164). Oxford University Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2017). Review of Rik Peels' 'Responsible Belief: A theory in Ethics and Epistemology'. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews [October 17, 2017].

Björnsson, Gunnar [with Kendy Hess]. (2017). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94(2), 273-298.

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2017) Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility. In P. Robichaud and J. Wieland (Eds.), Responsibility -- the Epistemic Condition (146–162). Oxford University Press.

Björnsson, Gunnar, & Brülde, Bengt. (2017). Normative Responsibilities: Structure and Sources. In K. Hens, D. Horstkötter & D. Cutas (Eds.) Parental Responsibility in the Context of Neuroscience and Genetics (pp. 13-33). Springer.

Hartman, Robert J. (2017). Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism. Journal of Philosophical Research, 42, 301-312.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2017). Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting. Disputatio, 9(45). 287-307.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2017). More Than a Feeling: The Communicative Function of Regret. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 25(5): 664-681.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2017). How Is Self-Forgiveness Possible? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98(1), 49-69.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2017). In Defense of Non-Reactive Attitudes. Philosophical Explorations, 20(3), 294-307.

Munthe, Christian. (2017). Hate Crime, Mental Disorder and Criminal Responsibility. In E. Dunbar, A. Blanco, D. Crevecoeur-MacPhail, C. Munthe, M. Fingerle, & D. Brax (Eds.), The Psychology of Hate Crimes as Domestic Terrorism: U. S. and Global Issues, Vol. 1 (pp. 225-238). Praeger.

Petersson, Björn. (2017). Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 8, 199-218. 

Russell, Paul. (2017). Free Will Pessimism. Lecture given to the Vitterhetsakademien/The Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities. Vitterhetsakademien Annual Year Book for 2017.(pp. 47-63).

Russell, Paul.(2017). Free Will Pessimism. In D. Shoemaker (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4 (pp. 93-120). Oxford University Press.

Russell, Paul. (2017). Review of 'Conversation and Responsibility' by Michael McKenna. Philosophical Review126, (2), 285-95.

Szigeti, András [with John A. Michael & Alessandro Salice]. (Eds.) (2017). Special Issue of Synthese ‘Thinking (About) Groups'. Synthese, 196, 4809–12.

Radovic, Susanna, [with Tova Bennet]. (2016). On the Abolition and Reintroduction of Legal Insanity in Sweden. In S. Moratti & D. Patterson (Eds.), Legal Insanity and the Brain (pp. 169-206). Hart Publishing Ltd. https://doi.org/10.5040/9781509902347

Björnsson, Gunnar. (2016). Outsourcing the Deep Self: Deep Self Discordance Does Not Explain Away Intuitions in Manipulation Arguments. Philosophical Psychology, 29(5), 637-653.

Björnsson, Gunnar [with Derk Pereboom]. (2016). Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility. In J. Sytsma & W. Buckwalter (Eds.), Companion to Experimental Philosophy (pp. 142-157). Blackwell.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016). Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 19(5), 1225-40.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016). Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism. Philosophia, 44(3). 793-808.

Jeppsson, Sofia. (2016). Accountability, Answerability and Freedom. Social Theory and Practice, 42(4). 681-705.

Matheson, Benjamin. (2016). In Defence of the Four-Case Argument. Philosophical Studies, 173(7), 1963-82.

Mickelson, Kristin. (2016). The Manipulation Argument. In K. Timpe, M. Griffith, & N. Levy (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will (pp. 166-178). Routledge.

Milam, Per-Erik. (2016). Reactive Attitudes and Personal Relationships. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(1), 102-122.

Russell, Paul. (2016). Free Will and Moral Sentiments: Strawsonian Theories. In M. Griffith, N. Levy and K. Timpe (eds.), In K. Timpe, M. Griffith, & N. Levy (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will (pp. 96-108). Routledge.

Radovic, Susanna [with Gerben Meynen & Tova Bennet]. (2015) Introducing a standard of legal insanity: The case of Sweden compared to The Netherlands. InternationalJournal of Law and Psychiatry, 40, 43-49.

Russell, Paul. (2015). Hume’s Lengthy Digression: Free Will in the Treatise. In A. Butler & D. Ainslie (Eds.), Hume’s Treatise: A Critical Guide (pp. 230-251). Cambridge University Press.

Szigeti, András. (2015). Review of Michael Bratman's 'Shared Agency'. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 18, 1101-1104.

Szigeti, András. (2015). Is Collective Mental Action Possible? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 6, 843-864.

Szigeti, András. (2015). Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas. Dialectica, 69(1), 1-22.